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A consensus in macroeconomics holds that the observed higher-frequency 
movements in employment and hours of work are movements along a 
labor-supply function caused by shifts of the labor demand function. 
Recent theoretical thinking has extended this view to include ﬂ  uctua-
tions in unemployment, so that macroeconomists can speak coherently 
of movements along an unemployment function caused by shifts in labor 
demand.
I develop an empirical framework for measuring the movements 
along the labor supply function and for measuring shifts of labor sup-
ply. I review data sources for the U.S. economy and conclude that the 
household survey is the only source of data that supports a clean set of 
measures of hours and employment. While recognizing the discrepancy 
between short-run movements of employment from the household survey 
and the employer payroll survey, at this point in my study I am unable 
to make any further contribution to reconciling the puzzle of the higher 
amplitude of employment ﬂ  uctuations in the employer survey.
The measurement framework presented in this paper rests on the infer-
ence of an underlying single unobserved variable that determines labor 
supply. At the paper’s end I discuss how this single driving force is related 
to modern macroeconomic labor-market theory. Here I use an econo-
metric model with a latent variable to infer the unobserved variable, 
which turns out to move closely with unemployment. This variable has 
a high correlation with weekly hours as well, though there is much more The Cyclical Sensitivity of Labor Supply 242
noise in the measurement of hours from the household survey than in the 
employer payroll survey.
II.  Labor Supply and Labor Demand
Figures 5.1 through 5.3 describe four different views of changes that 
occur in the aggregate labor market when labor demand shifts outward. 
The shift may be the result of improved aggregate productivity, declines 
in the prices of inputs other than labor, or a favorable shift in the terms 
of trade. The horizontal axis is total labor input measured in hours per 
year. The vertical axis is the hourly real wage.
Figure 5.1 shows the standard neoclassical view of the labor market, 
which holds that labor supply is fairly inelastic. The labor market clears 
at all times at the intersection of supply and demand. A large outward 
shift in demand raises labor input by a small amount and the wage by 
a substantial amount. As a theory of ﬂ  uctuations, the neoclassical view 
fails in describing both dimensions of demand and supply, as cyclical 
ﬂ  uctuations in hours are large but small for wages.
Figure 5.2 shows two views with the same properties but very different 
rationalizations. In the real business cycle model, labor supply is highly 
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elastic—the aggregate labor-supply schedule is essentially ﬂ  at. Real busi-
ness cycle theorists, notably Rogerson (1988), have provided analytical 
foundations for elastic supply and have addressed the important question 
of why studies of labor supply estimated at the level of individuals ﬁ  nd 
relatively low elasticities—see Rogerson and Wallenius (2007). Whether 
microeconomic and macroeconomic estimates of labor-supply elasticities 
can be reconciled is a lively topic of debate today.
 The other interpretation of Figure 5.2 takes the middle horizontal line 
to express rigidity of the real wage. It is not a standard supply schedule 
derived from the choices of workers about participation and hours, but 
the operation of a system of employment governance in which employ-
ers choose a level of labor input given a ﬁ  xed real wage rate. Theoretical 
rationalizations of this system of governance have not fared well in recent 
years, after early enthusiasm about the possibility that contracts made 
under asymmetric information might take this form. The rigid real wage 
model carries with it an explanation of unemployment—it is the horizon-
tal distance between the actual level of employment and the labor-supply 
curve of Figure 5.1. This rigid wage model is a gap theory of disequi-
librium unemployment. Yet little theoretical work has been done in this 
framework in recent years, especially in the American context.
Figure 5.2 
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Figure 5.3 illustrates the theory of labor-market ﬂ  uctuations underly-
ing the measurement work discussed in this paper. As mentioned earlier, 
labor supply has its inelastic neoclassical form. Absent frictions in the 
labor market, shifts in labor demand would cause small changes in hours 
and large changes in hourly real wages. But the model used in this paper 
embodies an economic equilibrium view of unemployment derived from 
an explicit consideration of frictions. Unemployment is not a gap but is 
the result of the interaction of search and matching frictions and com-
pensation determination. The search and matching elements are from 
Mortensen and Pissarides (1994). As Shimer (2005) demonstrated, search 
and matching frictions are not enough to explain cyclical ﬂ  uctuations in 
unemployment. Shimer’s paper set off an enthusiastic investigation of 
many different modiﬁ  cations of the Mortensen-Pissarides model. It is too 
early to say which will emerge as the leading explanation.
 The Mortensen-Pissarides model describes physical frictions (such as 
the search and hiring process on the part of ﬁ  rms and workers) in the labor 
market but not wage frictions. Wages clear the market in a sense that they 
are the result of an unrestricted voluntary bargain between employers 
and workers. The simplest way to alter the Mortensen-Pissarides model 
in a way that makes it consistent with Figure 5.3 is to introduce what 
Figure 5.3 





Employment supply Labor force supply
Unemployment
245 Robert E. Hall
I call equilibrium wage stickiness (see Hall 2005a). With this form of 
wage rigidity, the extended Mortensen-Pissarides model implies that an 
outward shift of labor demand, as it tries to push the wage up, will also 
reduce unemployment substantially. The result, as Figure 5.3 shows, is an 
increase in labor input that is much larger than the movement along the 
labor supply schedule because of the added effect of drawing people out 
of unemployment and putting them to work.
The line of thought expressed in Figure 5.3 embodies a full economic 
treatment of an individual’s three possible activities related to the job 
market—remaining completely out of the labor force (specializing in non-
market activity), looking for work, and being employed. In that sense, it 
is a natural extension of modeling from two activities, as illustrated in 
the ﬁ  rst two ﬁ  gures, to three activities. But it is important to understand 
that the unemployment curve shown in Figure 5.3 is not just an expres-
sion of individual choice about how much time to spend looking for 
work. Rather, it is the equilibrium of the search and matching process 
together with wage determination. Individual choices about search and 
job acceptance are only one component of that equilibrium. For further 
discussion, see Hall (2008).
III.  Earlier Work on Cyclical Fluctuations in the Labor Market
All of the earlier macroeconomic research that I have located so far takes 
unemployment, employment, or output as the measure of the business 
cycle in the labor market. I am not aware of work that infers an unob-
served index.
Participation
Tella (1964) was an early and inﬂ  uential investigator of higher-frequency 
movements in aggregate labor-force participation. He considered the 
relation between the participation rate and the employment-to-popula-
tion ratio, focusing on higher frequencies by using ﬁ  rst differences and 
ﬁ  nding coefﬁ  cients of 0.40 for men and 0.62 for women. These ﬁ  gures 
are substantially higher than those found in later work and in this paper, 
probably because participation is one of the components of the right-
hand variable, and because he used data from 1948 through 1962, when The Cyclical Sensitivity of Labor Supply 246
women’s labor force participation was lower than it has been in subse-
quent decades.
Wachter (1977) found that for men, participation increased for all 
age groups in tight labor markets with low unemployment, though the 
effects are small except for teenagers and those over 65 years of age. For 
women, he found similar results for all but the older groups, for whom 
participation declines in tight markets.
Hours
Raisian (1983) studied the cyclical variation of hours per week and weeks 
per year as a function of experience in the labor market, using data from 
the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. He found that the elasticity of hours 
per week with respect to the employment rate (1 minus the unemploy-
ment rate) was 0.30, and that the elasticity of weeks per year was 1.14. 
The latter ﬁ  gure implies an elasticity of participation of 0.14.
Cho and Cooley (1994) took as a stylized fact of the U.S. business cycle 
that one-quarter of the variation in total hours of work is in hours per 
worker, and the remaining three-quarters is in workers per member of the 
working-age population. These are approximately the relative standard 
deviations of Hodrick-Prescott ﬁ  ltered hours per worker and employment.
IV.  Framework and Data
The objective of this paper, which is part of a larger research agenda, is 
to develop a conceptual framework and corresponding data in which the 
three dimensions of labor supply—participation, employment rate, and 
hours—play roles derived from the macroeconomic theory of labor sup-
ply and unemployment.
The modern theory that provides the logical starting point for this 
paper’s measurement framework runs as follows: Individuals have pref-
erences deﬁ  ned over hours spent at home, hours of search, and hours of 
work. Each period (months are used in this paper) they choose an alloca-
tion of hours out of a set of available choices. Hours spent looking for 
work and hours spent at home are not restricted, but hours spent at work 
depend on the jobs available that period—workers do not have unilateral 
choice over jobs or the hours of jobs.
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The macroeconomic theory of unemployment that has emerged from 
Mortensen and Pissarides’s pioneering work focuses on the interacting 
behavior of job-seekers and employers. Hall (2007) gives an extended 
discussion of a generalization of their model. The job-creation efforts 
of employers control the unemployment rate. Employers respond to the 
job-creation incentive deﬁ  ned by the gap between the marginal prod-
uct of labor (that is, labor demand) and the wage they expect to pay 
a newly hired worker. Wage ﬂ  exibility is a key issue. If an increase in 
labor demand results in an equal increase in the wage, job creation and 
thus unemployment remain unchanged. The stickier the wage, the stron-
ger is the decline in unemployment in response to an increase in labor 
demand. Some bargaining models imply sticky wages—see Hall and Mil-
grom (2008). Another source of wage stickiness is efﬁ  ciency wages—see 
Alexopolous (2004).
Individuals’ and ﬁ  rms’ choices map into the three observable labor 
market activities for individuals. The Current Population Survey (CPS) 
uses certain important conventions in assigning individuals to activities. 
Although the CPS is a monthly survey, it uses a combination of time peri-
ods in the assignment process. The ﬁ  rst convention is that work trumps 
any other activity, in the sense that a person who worked even one hour 
in the week before the survey is counted as employed, notwithstanding 
any other time spent at home or in a job search. The second convention 
is that a person not recorded as employed is recorded as unemployed if 
the person was not participating in the workforce in the previous week, 
but made any of a variety of designated types of efforts to ﬁ  nd a job in the 
preceding four weeks. Those who fail to meet the criteria for employment 
or unemployment are counted as out of the labor force.
The recent launch of the American Time Use Survey (ATUS) will pro-
vide a far more complete view of the allocation of household time. The 
new survey focuses on measuring all uses of time rather than assigning 
individuals to categories based on partial measures. However, the size of 
the ATUS sample is not large enough to support good national estimates 
of monthly labor-market status.
Flinn and Heckman (1983) make the reasonable proposal that the 
unemployed should be taken to be non-working individuals who have a 
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period. The CPS deﬁ  nition of unemployment appears to implement a 
rough approximation to the Flinn-Heckman deﬁ  nition. Along with Flinn-
Heckman, the CPS deﬁ  nition does not classify people as unemployed if 
these individuals have decided that no job realistically likely to become 
available would be superior to engaging in non-work activities. The 
CPS has a separate category for these people, often called discouraged 
workers.
The home activities that occupy all individuals, employed or not, 
include home production as well as leisure. As the ATUS shows, these 
activities include shopping, cooking, and caring for others, together with 
sleep and pure leisure, such as watching television or socializing.
V. Measuring  Employment
The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) runs two independent surveys aimed 
at determining a seemingly simple concept: the number of people at work 
in the United States at a given moment. In addition to the CPS count of 
employment, the BLS surveys employers about the number of workers 
on their payrolls. Almost from the beginning of the household survey, 
economists noted cyclical discrepancies between the two surveys—the 
payroll measure of employment rises faster in expansions and falls faster 
in recessions than does the CPS measure. The report of the President’s 
Committee to Appraise Employment and Unemployment Statistics com-
mented extensively on the issue in 1962. Economists afﬁ  liated with the 
party in power ﬁ  nd reasons to praise the CPS measurement during reces-
sions—especially the most recent one—while others cite the payroll sur-
vey as the more accurate description of the ravages of the downturn.
Figure 5.4 compares employment counts from the two sources. It 
shows the raw ratio of the payroll count to the household count together 
with its higher-frequency component. The latter comprises the residuals 
from a regression of the ratio on a fourth-order polynomial in time. The 
payroll count rose irregularly from 82 percent of the CPS level in 1959 
to 97 percent at its maximum at the end of the 1990s and then fell to its 
current level of 94 percent.
The higher-frequency component of the ratio comparing the house-
hold survey with the employer survey is conspicuously correlated with 
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the business cycle. In each recession, the payroll count falls by 1 to 3 
percent of the CPS count. The decline was particularly large in the most 
recent recession. It was large in the worst postwar recession that took 
place in 1981–1982, but not as large in the other deep postwar recession 
that occurred between 1973 and 1975.
The cyclical discrepancy between these two measures remains almost 
entirely unexplained. Table 5.1 shows a dissection of the conceptual dif-
ferences between the two employment measures based on Bowler and 
Morisi (2006). The top line is the percentage shortfall of the payroll count 
from the CPS count. During the expansion years, 1994 through 2000, the 
shortfall shrank and then expanded during the recession and following 
years, 2000 through 2004. The column headed Cycle is the percentage 
growth from 2000 through 2004 plus two-thirds of the shrinkage from 
1994 though 2004. This ﬁ  gure is zero if the ﬁ  gures to the left grow linearly 
with time and is positive if the ﬁ  gures to the left fall during the expansion 
and rise during the contraction, as the payroll shortfall plainly does.
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Figure 5.4
Ratio of Payroll Employment to Current Population Survey Employment
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Census Bureau, and author’s 
calculations.
Note: The higher-frequency component comprises the residuals from a regression 
of the ratio on a fourth-order polynomial in time.The Cyclical Sensitivity of Labor Supply 250
The entries collectively labeled “Components from CPS” report com-
ponents of CPS employment measures that are conceptually different 
from the payroll data, stated as percentages of the total CPS employment 
count. The business-cycle measure is given in the right column for each 
adjustment. A positive cycle measure means that the component helps 
explain the pro-cyclical discrepancy between the employer payroll mea-
surement and CPS household counts.
The ﬁ  rst of the conceptual differences between the two employment 
measures is that the CPS one includes the self-employed and wage earners 
in agriculture, whereas the payroll data exclude agricultural employment. 
The cycle measure is negative for this component—the strong labor mar-
ket of 2000 resulted in an upward deﬂ  ection in agricultural employment. 
This phenomenon only deepens the mystery of the cyclical discrepancy, 
as it would make the CPS measurement by itself more cyclical than the 
payroll data.
The second adjustment shows an important source of the cyclical dis-
crepancy—self-employment—which declined sharply as a fraction of 
CPS employment during the 1994–2000 expansion, and rose a bit during 
the 2001 recession and its aftermath. The payroll data exclude the self-
employed.
The four remaining CPS components shown in Table 5.1 account for 
trivial percentages of the cyclical movements. Unpaid family workers and 
Table 5.1
Components of CPS Employment Related to Conceptual Differences from 
Payroll Data
1994 2000 2004
Shortfall of payroll jobs
Components from CPS
 Agriculture
  Non-ag self employed
  Non-ag unpaid family workers
  Private household workers
 Unpaid  absence
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private household workers, included in the CPS but excluded from the 
payroll data, comprise tiny fractions of total employment and have no 
cyclical component. People who have jobs but are not currently being 
paid—individuals counted in the CPS household measurement but not in 
the payroll data—make no contribution to the cycle. And second jobs—
counted twice in the payroll count of jobs but only once in the CPS count 
of employed people—make a small contribution in the wrong direction 
to explain the discrepancy between the two employment estimates.
Notice that the total CPS components almost perfectly match the pay-
roll counts in the years 1994 and 2004, but result in an excess of payroll 
employment in the peak year, 2000.
According to Table 5.1, the cyclical discrepancy in employment counts 
between the two surveys is almost completely a mystery. The table covers 
all but one of the important conceptual differences between the surveys, 
the length of the reference period. In the CPS measurement, a person 
who worked one hour or more in the week before the survey counts 
as employed. The payroll survey counts the number of people on an 
employer’s payroll at any time during the pay period that includes the 
twelfth of the month. My impression is that pay periods are generally 
two weeks, half a month, or a month. 
Explaining the relationship between the length of the pay period and 
the overstatement of monthly snapshot of unemployment by the payroll 
data is simple: the overstatement is the weekly rate of new hires times 
the number of weeks in the pay period. Hall (2005b) discusses evidence 
on cyclical variation in the new hire rate. The Job Openings and Labor 
Turnover Survey (JOLTS) measures the new hire rate directly and shows 
little variation in the only business cycle that has occurred since it was 
launched in 2000. The separation rate is an excellent proxy for the new 
hire rate—the two measures differ only by the rate of change of employ-
ment, which at all times is insigniﬁ  cant in comparison to the levels of 
new hires and separations. The CPS has measured total separations since 
1994, so it too includes only the most recent cycle. Figure 2.4 in Hall 
(2005b) shows that the monthly separation rate fell by about half a per-
cent from the strong labor market of 2000 to the weak market of 2003. 
The weekly rate thus fell by a little over one-tenth of one percent. Even 
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overstatement of employment caused by longer pay periods are tiny in 
relation to the observed discrepancy in the cyclical behaviors of CPS and 
payroll employment measurements.
Absent an understanding of the source of the extra cyclical movements 
of the payroll employment data, it is not possible to use the data in the 
three-activity framework normally used in research on labor-market 
dynamics. The difﬁ  culty is that the individual fractions of the population 
engaging in the three possible activities—out of the labor force, unem-
ployed, and working—must sum to one. The payroll survey provides no 
measure of the ﬁ  rst two activities. One would have to adjust the frac-
tions from the CPS household survey for calculating the fractions of the 
population that are out of the labor force and are unemployed to satisfy 
adding up to one. There is no basis for making the fraction of those out 
of the labor force and the fraction of those unemployed more countercy-
clical than is reported in the CPS, but these adjustments would be needed 
to incorporate the payroll employment data.
VI. Data  on  Hours
The CPS asks the household respondent (often not the actual worker 
whose activity is reported), a question like, “So, for last week, how many 
hours did the individual actually work at her or his job?” (the computer 
tailors the question to the individual worker). The survey procedure 
gathers hours separately by job for multiple-job holders. The respondent 
decides what constitutes an hour of work—whether it includes breaks, 
setup time, and the like.
The CPS measure of hours drops dramatically at random, such as 
when a holiday falls in the reference week. The choice of the reference 
week as the one including the twelfth of the month dodges Thanksgiving, 
Christmas, and several other major holidays, but cannot exclude every 
holiday celebrated in the United States. Monthly plots of hours show 
these drops.
The BLS also provides a comprehensive measure of hours based pri-
marily on the payroll data, extended to agriculture and self-employment 
with CPS data; see the Major Sector Productivity and Costs (MSPC) index 
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at http://bls.gov/lpc/home.htm. The payroll survey determines hours paid 
per job from employers. The MSPC index restates the results on the basis 
of hours worked rather than hours paid, using another survey that col-
lects both. The MSPC index also uses CPS hours for workers not covered 
by the payroll survey. Although the MSPC measure of hours is mainly 
hours per job rather than hours per worker, there is so little cyclical varia-
tion in jobs per worker that the distinction is unimportant for the study 
of cyclical phenomena.
Figure 5.5 compares the two sources of data on hours. Hours as mea-
sured by the MSPC fell by about 10 percent relative to CPS hours from 
1959 to 2005. I am not aware of any discussion or explanation of this 
behavior. As in Figure 5.4, I also show the higher-frequency component. 
It is relatively small and not conspicuously cyclical. Apart from the differ-


























Ratio of Major Sector Productivity and Costs Index Hours to Current 
Population Survey Hours
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Census Bureau, and author’s 
calculations.
Note: The higher-frequency component comprises the residuals from a 
regression of the ratio on a fourth-order polynomial in time.
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VII.  The Single Driving Force of Movements along the Labor Supply 
Function
The consensus of modern macroeconomics is that shifts of labor supply 
are not a signiﬁ  cant driving force of the business cycle. Rather, productiv-
ity shocks, oil shocks and other shifts in the terms of trade, and changes 
in other factor prices move workers along their labor supply schedules. 
Hours of work reﬂ  ect variations over time in the current payoff to work 
relative to the value of other activities. Choices about whether to partici-
pate in the labor market also reﬂ  ect a similar choice. Both of these derive 
from perfectly standard models of labor supply.
A more recent extension, deriving from the work of Mortensen and Pis-
sarides (1994), of this consensus view has developed a model incorporat-
ing job search, the third use of an individual’s time, that responds to the 
same factors affecting labor supply. Hall (2007) shows how unemploy-
ment ﬁ  ts into a model of labor-market ﬂ  uctuations. That paper derives 
two indexes that jointly capture the driving forces of labor-market ﬂ  uc-
tuations. One index describes the overall well-being of households, based 
on expectations of future earnings. The other describes the current state 
of the labor market. The two indexes are highly correlated, so it is a 
reasonable approximation to treat the labor market as having a single 
driving force, the approach taken in this paper.
The important point that derives from this line of thought is that a 
single force drives all three key measures—participation, unemployment, 
and hours of work. This single force is the current position of the labor 
demand function in relation to its typical level trend. When labor demand 
is unusually strong, labor force participation rises, unemployment falls, 
and hours of work rise. The rest of this paper will derive a measure of the 
single driving force from the multiple indicators and measure the relative 
cyclical sensitivities of participation, unemployment, and hours.
The model underlying this work—and the conclusion about a single 
driving force—does not necessarily rest on any ideas of the kind usually 
labeled Keynesian. In fact, all of the paper’s conclusions, except the mag-
nitude of the ﬂ  uctuations, will hold in a neoclassical, real-business-cycle 
model, extended only in the direction of Mortensen-Pissarides. Although 
the easiest way to explain the observed amplitude of the responses of 
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labor-market variables to the driving force is with sticky wages, it is an 
open and very interesting question whether other mechanisms may be 
involved as well, or if any wage or price stickiness is required to explain 
the labor supply response.
To derive a measure of the single driving force, I use three monthly 
measures that track the business cycle. Two measures are from the labor 
market: unemployment and hours. To put unemployment in a form that 
makes it interchangeable (except for sign) with employment per partici-
pant in a log-additive framework, I measure unemployment as the nega-
tive of the log of the employment rate. The third measure in the cyclical 
model is real disposable personal income per capita (see National Income 
and Product Accounts, Table 2.6).
The following econometric setup enables the measurement of the com-
mon driving force, zt:
(1)  yt = γyzt + τy (t) + εy,t
(2)  ut = γuzt + τu (t) + εu,t
(3)  ht = γhzt + τh (t) + εh,t .
Here yt is log real income, ut is the unemployment rate, and ht is the log 
of weekly hours of work. The γ s are the loading factors of the observed 
variables on the unobserved driving force, zt. These factors are interpreted 
as elasticities of the component with respect to the cyclical driving force. 
The τ(t) functions capture slower-moving non-cyclical determinants of 
the observed variables and the εs are the idiosyncratic higher-frequency 
movements not associated with the cyclical driving force zt —the εs are 
assumed to be uncorrelated with zt. I assume that zt, whose units are 
arbitrary, has a variance of one. I also assume that γu is negative, so zt is 
procyclical.
I specify the τ(t) functions as fourth-order polynomials in time. I also 
include seasonal dummies for hours because the data are not season-
ally adjusted. The model has two sets of moment conditions. The ﬁ  rst 
are standard regression conditions—orthogonality of the time variables 
in the τ functions with the disturbances. The regression part—like all 
regressions—has the same number of moment conditions and unknown 
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The second set of moment conditions describes the latent-variable 
structure of the disturbances. This part of the model has six observed 
moments: three variances of the ε disturbances, Vy, Vu, and Vh, and three 
covariances, Cu,y, Cu,h, and Ch,y. It has six unknown parameters, γy, γu, 
γh, σy, σu, and σh, where the last three are the standard deviations of the 
idiosyncratic components. The latent-variable model is exactly identiﬁ  ed 
and has the following moment conditions: 
(4)  Cu,y = γuγy , 
(5)  Cu,h = γuγh ,  
(6)  Ch,y = γhγy ,  
(7)  σy








2 = Vh − γ 
h
2 . 
The overall model is exactly identiﬁ   ed. Its moment conditions are 
block-triangular—I can solve for the regression parameters ﬁ  rst, and then 
derive the latent-variable parameters. The ﬁ  rst step is to estimate regres-
sions of the three variables on the components making up the τ functions 
(powers of t and seasonal dummies). I denote the residuals from these 
regressions as y ˆt and similarly for u and h. The variances and covariances 
in the moment conditions for the latent-variable model then refer to the 
hatted residuals.
From the moment conditions, I derive









with the square root taken as positive. The remaining parameters come 
directly from the moment conditions. Notice that the model imposes 
a condition on the signs of the covariances—the expression under the 
square root is non-negative. In addition, the implied values of the squared 
values of three σ parameters must be non-negative.
To infer the values of the single driving force zt, I use the projection 
of z on the observed variables; that is, the ﬁ  tted values of the regression 
of z on those variables. The regression coefﬁ  cients are the inverse of the 
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covariance matrix of the variables (observed), multiplying the vector of 
covariances of z and the variables. The covariances are just the estimated 
parameters γ, because the variance of z is one.
Table 5.2 shows the results of these calculations. The top panel shows 
the variances and covariances of the residuals from the preliminary 
regressions. The unemployment rate is in percent and real income and 
hours in 100 times their natural logs. Hours and unemployment have 
about the same variances but the variance of real income, around its 
lower-frequency trend, is quite a bit higher. The covariances of the three 
variables are as expected—unemployment is countercyclical and income 
and hours are procyclical.
The ﬁ  rst line in the lower panel of Table 5.2 shows the loading coef-
ﬁ  cients, γ, for the three variables. Unemployment has a loading coefﬁ  -
cient on the cyclical driving force of just under 1. The next line shows 
that unemployment has a fairly low idiosyncratic movement—the vari-
ance of its non-cyclical higher-frequency movements is only 0.22. Real 
income loads on the cyclical component with an elasticity of 1.39 and has 
an idiosyncratic variance of 2.27, about half its total variance of 4.20. 
Hours load on the cyclical driving force with an elasticity of 0.56, leaving 
a large idiosyncratic variance of 1.32 out of its total variance of 1.64.
The a coefﬁ  cients for extracting the implied time series for the driving 
force z show that the optimal inference places a large negative coefﬁ  cient 
on unemployment and smaller positive coefﬁ  cients on real income and 
hours. Figure 5.6 shows the index z ˆt. 
Table 5.2
Inference of Cyclical Driving Force from Data on Unemployment, Real Income, 
and Hours
Unemployment Real income Hours
Moments
 Unemployment
 Real  income
 Hours
Parameters
 Loading  on  z, γ
 Variance,  σ²
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VIII.  Cyclical Sensitivity of Participation, Unemployment, and Hours
I am now equipped to answer the basic question of the cyclical sensi-
tivities of participation, unemployment, and hours. Table 5.3 shows the 
loading factors for the three dimensions of work effort on the driving 
force, z. For employment, the coefﬁ  cient is the positive value of the one 
shown in Table 5.2 and for hours, it is the value shown there. For par-
ticipation, not included in the earlier model, I show the coefﬁ  cient of the 
regression of log of the CPS participation rate on the inferred measure, z ˜; 
the regression also includes the fourth-order polynomial in t as in the ear-
lier regressions. For all three components, I measure the standard error 
from that type of regression. The total loading shown at the bottom is 
just the sum of the loadings of the three components.
The ﬁ  rst line of Table 5.3 shows the small but statistically unambigu-
ous cycle in participation. Recall that the units of the cyclical driving 
forces are standard deviations of cyclical movements in the labor market. 
A one standard deviation tightening of the labor market raises participa-
tion by 0.2 percent. Because the aggregate level of participation is around 
60 percent, this increase in the driving force increases labor force partici-
Figure 5.6
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pation by about 0.12 percentage points. The response of participation is 
11.6 percent of the total response of labor input.
Employment, shown in the second line, is a bit more than half of the 
total cyclical variation. A tightening of the market by one standard devia-
tion raises employment and lowers unemployment by just under one per-
centage point.
Weekly hours, shown in the third line, account for a third of total cycli-
cal variation in labor input.
Tables 5.2 and 5.3 deal with labor measures per person. Table 5.4 con-
siders the employment count, the product of population, participation, 
and the employment rate. I will not consider the employment count in 
the rest of the paper, but it does permit a further consideration of the dif-
ference between the CPS and payroll data, as the latter take the form of 
employment counts only, without the breakdown into population, par-
ticipation, and the employment rate.
Table 5.4 needs to put population on the same footing as the other 
measures, as the higher-frequency component obtained as residuals from 
Table 5.3
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the regression of the log of population on a fourth-order polynomial in 
time. Then, to reconcile the CPS measures, including population, with 
the payroll measure in the measurement framework used in the paper, it 
needs to measure the loading of population on the cyclical driving force. 
The population loading component is −0.147, with a standard error of 
0.018. How can population be countercyclical? Obviously population 
does not respond to the forces that cause the business cycle, but popula-
tion swings could be a contributor to the cycle. This hypothesis seems 
to be part of the explanation—unusually low population growth during 
World War II led to a tighter labor market in the late 1960s, before the 
baby boomers entered, and unusually high population growth led to a 
slacker market in the period containing the weakest labor market, 1973 
through 1983, as the boomers started work. Another part of the expla-
nation is discontinuous increases in the population estimates used in the 
CPS at the beginning of 1990 and 2000, both near cyclical peaks.
The loading of the CPS employment count on the cyclical driving force 
is very close to 1. The loading is only slightly higher than the loading for 
employment per participant in Table 5.3, because the negative effect of 
population offsets the positive role of participation.
By contrast, the loading of the log of payroll employment on the cycli-
cal driving force is much higher, at 1.512. The stronger cycle in payroll 
employment shows through prominently in the framework of the cyclical 
driving force, even though the driving force is derived completely inde-
pendently of the payroll data.
Although higher-frequency changes in the working-age population are 
shifts of labor supply rather than movements along a labor-supply func-
tion, the movements in participation, unemployment, and hours consid-
ered in this paper are movements along their respective functions. The 
discovery that population movements are part of the driving force of 
those movements is quite consistent with the overall framework of this 
paper.
IX.  Cyclical Responses by Demographic Groups
Table 5.5 breaks down the responses shown in Table 5.3 by age and sex, 
to the extent that the data are available from the BLS. Long historical 
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tabulations of the data are incomplete, though the important features of 
the differences among demographic groups are visible and in accord with 
prior beliefs. The hours data in Table 5.5 begin in June 1976.
Table 5.5 conﬁ   rms that the participation elasticity is higher for 
younger workers (those under 25 years of age) and for older workers 
(those over 54 years of age), and among younger workers is higher for 
women than for men. The more elastic groups contain a larger fraction 
of people who are close to the margin between choosing to participate 
in the labor force and choosing to specialize in non-work activities, pri-
marily activities at home and attending school. Unemployment among 
men and among younger workers is more sensitive to the driving 
force.
The elasticities of hours with respect to the cyclical driving force are 
slightly lower for women than for men. For both sexes, the response of 
hours is much higher for the younger workers.
Table 5.5
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X.  A More Complete View of Driving Forces
Hall (2008) develops a model of labor supply and unemployment derived 
from the underlying principles of labor supply and a generalization of 
the Mortensen-Pissarides search-and-matching view of unemployment. 
In the Hall model, hours of work and unemployment are linked to the 
rest of the economy through two variables. One is the marginal product 
of labor, which conveys the demand for labor. The other is the marginal 
utility of consumption, which conveys the long-run well-being of work-
ers. Because the marginal product of labor is the primary determinant 
of well-being and because the marginal product of labor tends to evolve 
as a random walk, the marginal product of labor and the marginal util-
ity of consumption are quite highly correlated. In this paper, I make the 
approximation that the correlation is so high that these can be treated as 
a single variable, which I call the driving force, z. 
The analysis of some issues of the response of labor-market variables 
requires the two-variable framework. In particular, all macroeconomic 
models agree that an expansion in government purchases of goods and 
services tightens the labor market, raises hours of work, and decreases 
unemployment. The increased government spending does not change the 
demand for labor as measured by the marginal product of labor. Instead, 
it depresses long-term well-being because any increase in government 
purchases must be paid for, sooner or later, by reduced consumption. 
Hours of work increase because of the negative wealth effect in labor 
supply—higher government purchases decrease wealth and raises hours. 
Hall (2007) shows that the same effect operates on unemployment—
lower wealth results in lower unemployment.
In the framework with two variables, the consensus I noted in the 
introduction might be phrased more precisely as “a consensus in mac-
roeconomics holds that the observed higher-frequency movements in 
employment and hours of work are movements along labor-supply and 
employment functions caused by changes in fundamentals acting through 
the marginal product of labor and the marginal utility of consumption.” 
The consensus viewpoint rules out shifts of the labor-supply and employ-
ment functions as important sources of ﬂ  uctuations.
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XI. Interpretation
I have not tested the consensus viewpoint that shifts in labor demand 
account for most of the cyclical variation in labor input. But it holds up 
well provisionally in the analysis of this paper. First, all three compo-
nents of the labor demand function—participation, the employment rate 
for participants, and hours per week of workers—respond positively to 
my measure of cyclical shifts in labor demand. Because these shifts are 
transitory, these involve mostly substitution effects. Basic labor-supply 
theory shows that the substitution effect in participation and in hours per 
worker should be positive. The extended Mortensen-Pissarides theory 
requires the substitution effect for the employment rate to be positive as 
well.
More than half of the extra labor input in a cyclical upswing is drawn 
from the ranks of the unemployed. No model of the cycle in the labor 
market can claim any realism unless it takes this ﬁ  nding seriously. It 
is inappropriate to lump those assigned by the CPS to unemployment 
together with those workers found to be out of the labor force, because 
the unemployed are much more likely to be employed a month later. The 
unemployed are truly different from other people who are not working 
because they generally wind up working within a few months.
Research trying to explain the high cyclical elasticity of unemploy-
ment has made exciting advances in the past few years, but a great deal 
remains to be done.
 Prepared for the 52nd Economic Conference of the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Boston, Cape Cod, June 18 to 20, 2007. This research is part 
of the Economic Fluctuations and Growth program of the National 
Bureau of Economic Research. Data and programs are available from 
the author—Google “Robert Hall”.
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Comments on “Cyclical Movements along the 
Labor Supply Function” by Robert E. Hall
Katharine G. Abraham
I very much enjoyed reading Hall’s paper. From an empirical point of 
view, the paper does two things. First, it develops an innovative measure 
of high frequency shifts in labor demand. Second, given this monthly 
index of labor demand, it decomposes the total response of labor input 
to shifts in labor demand into the pieces represented by changes in labor 
force participation, changes in the share of people in the labor force who 
are employed, and changes in weekly hours. I will discuss these topics in 
turn.
As conceptualized in the paper, the index of labor demand is a latent 
variable that drives observable outcomes in the labor market. The behav-
ior of this driving force is inferred from de-trended data series on the log 
of real personal disposable income per capita, the unemployment rate 
(measured as the negative of the log of the employment rate), and the 
log of weekly hours of work. Three regression equations are speciﬁ  ed, 
each of which relates one of the observed variables just mentioned to the 
unobserved cyclical driving force (zt), a fourth-order polynomial in time 
and, in the hours equation, a set of seasonal dummies. The values of the 
zt variable are inferred using a set of moment conditions. These implied 
values are somewhat surprising, in the sense that they do not conform 
especially well to what most people think they know about the relative 
severity of recessions over the last few decades. In particular, the behavior 
of this index of labor demand is virtually the same in the recession of the 
early 1990s as in the recession of the mid-1970s, whereas conventional 
measures show the mid-1970s recession to have been much more severe 
than the recession of the early 1990s. This leads me to wonder what it The Cyclical Sensitivity of Labor Supply 266
is about the way in which the labor demand index is constructed that 
produces this result. One observation I would make is that the index of 
labor demand in essence reﬂ  ects the behavior of the residuals of the three 
observable variables—personal income per capita, unemployment, and 
weekly hours—from a quadratic trend. The quadratic trend may pick 
up not only the longer-term inﬂ  uences on the observable variables it is 
intended to capture, but also movements that more properly could be 
considered cyclical.
A second observation relates to the use of personal disposable income 
in the system of equations from which the labor demand index is derived. 
Given the purpose for which the system is estimated, it would seem that 
the dependent variables in the individual equations should be outcomes 
that depend rather directly on the demand for labor. Much of personal dis-
posable income can be categorized as labor income, but personal dispos-
able income also includes the part of proprietor’s income that represents 
returns to capital as well as a substantial amount of government transfer 
payments. I wonder whether it might not have been better to construct 
the system using a measure of employee compensation as a dependent 
variable in place of the measure of personal disposable income. 
The most serious question I have about the system of equations Hall 
used to estimate the labor demand index, however, is the presence of sep-
arate equations for employment and hours. Thinking about how adjust-
ments to changes in the demand for labor occur, employment and hours 
can be viewed as substitutes for one another: if the demand for labor falls, 
ﬁ  rms may reduce employment, cut workers’s hours, or a combination of 
both. The point here is that employment and hours need not respond in 
the same way to changes in the demand for labor. With the estimating 
equations as speciﬁ  ed, however, it is the co-movements in these variables’ 
responses that will be reﬂ  ected in the index of labor demand. This then 
leads me to wonder whether it might not have been better to use a mea-
sure of total hours, rather than separate measures of employment and 
weekly hours, in the estimating equations. 
Let me turn now to the second part of the paper, which looks at the 
responsiveness of participation, employment, and weekly hours of work 
to changes in the index of labor demand. The equations used to estimate 
these responses are speciﬁ  ed in a rather parsimonious fashion. For start-
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ers, the model makes no allowance for lags in the response of any of the 
three labor input variables to changes in labor demand. It also makes 
no allowance for changes over time in the way in which the different 
labor input variables respond to changes in labor demand. As an aside, I 
might also mention that one needs to be careful in characterizing the esti-
mates obtained from the model. The paper is very careful in its choice of 
words—talking about labor input rather than labor supply—but this is a 
conference on labor supply and, to the extent that decisions about hiring 
and hours are made by the employer rather than by the worker, it should 
be emphasized that the outcomes that are observed cannot be interpreted 
as labor supply responses, but rather can be traced to labor demand. 
The main ﬁ  ndings in this part of the paper decompose the response of 
labor input to changes in labor demand into shares due to changes in labor 
force participation, changes in the (un)employment rate, and changes in 
hours of work. Changes in labor force participation are relatively unim-
portant. A suggestion to be made here is that, in carrying out this sort of 
decomposition exercise, there could be value in thinking about where the 
boundary between being in and being out of the labor force is drawn. In 
the ofﬁ  cial data series that underlie the estimates reported in the paper, 
people are considered to be in the labor force if they are either counted as 
working or as being unemployed, with the unemployed including people 
who want to work, are available for work, and have actively looked for 
work in the last four weeks. But this boundary could be drawn differ-
ently, with either more or fewer people counted as belonging to the labor 
force and, at least in principle, this could affect the results obtained. The 
Bureau of Labor Statistics produces several alternate measures that draw 
the boundary somewhat differently – for example, changing the position 
of the boundary to include people who searched for work in the past year 
but not in the past four weeks as belonging to the labor force. In prac-
tice, the cyclical behavior of these alternate measures appears to be very 
similar to the cyclical behavior of the ofﬁ  cial unemployment rate, which 
makes me think this is probably not a major issue for the analysis. Still, 
this seems like something that might merit a bit more careful explora-
tion. 
Most of the response of labor input to changes in the index of labor 
demand is attributable to changes in the (un)employment rate (the share The Cyclical Sensitivity of Labor Supply 268
of the labor force that is (un)employed), and changes in weekly hours. At 
least to my eyes, in Hall’s paper, changes in weekly hours account for a 
large share of this response. My reading of the message to be taken from 
the literature on the dynamics of labor demand is that, in the United 
States, adjustment to changing labor demand conditions tends to occur 
through changes in employment rather than through changes in weekly 
hours. In the results reported here, however, ﬂ  uctuations in weekly hours 
account for about a third of the overall response. The framework here is 
rather different than the framework used in the labor economics litera-
ture with which I am more familiar, but I nonetheless ﬁ  nd this paper’s 
results a bit surprising. In the remainder of my comments, I would like to 
consider why hours adjustment appears to be so important here. 
In part, I suspect, these ﬁ  ndings may reﬂ  ect the way that the labor 
demand index is constructed. As I have already noted, by construction, 
the labor demand index reﬂ  ects only the common movements in income, 
employment, and hours. I worry that the approach adopted in this paper 
builds in an association between weekly hours worked and the labor 
demand index that would not be there if, for example, a measure of 
total hours had been used in place of the separate employment and hours 
measures. 
A second issue, discussed at some length in the paper, is that the mea-
sure of employment derived from the Current Population Survey (CPS) 
on which the paper rests is much less cyclical than the measure derived 
from the monthly employer payroll survey. One might suspect that the 
different behavior of the two measures could be explained by their dif-
ferent conceptual underpinnings—for example, the inclusion of the self-
employed in the CPS measure but not in the payroll survey measure—but 
accounting for these conceptual differences in fact does little to make 
the two series more comparable. If the payroll survey does a better job 
of measuring employment than the household survey, then, properly 
measured, the responsiveness of hours is relatively less important than 
implied by the estimates reported here. 
Which measure of employment—the CPS measure or the payroll sur-
vey measure —is more believable? To answer this question, we need ﬁ  rst 
to understand why the cyclical behavior of the two employment measures 
has been so different. A variety of explanations have been proposed, but 
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at this point there is no obvious “smoking gun.” Potential explanations 
that seem to me to merit further investigation include possible problems 
with the classiﬁ  cation of people as self-employed versus wage-and-sal-
ary workers in the CPS, cyclical movements in the amount of “off-the-
books” employment recorded in the CPS that do not show up in the 
payroll survey, and problems with the CPS population controls related 
to difﬁ  culties in accounting for immigration—but I cannot tell you that 
any of these potential explanations will end up offering an answer. In 
the meantime, the uncertainty about which employment series should be 
believed makes it difﬁ  cult to know how much conﬁ  dence to place in this 
paper’s estimates. 
In summary, Hall’s paper offers a creative and interesting approach 
to the measurement of ﬂ  uctuations in labor demand and their effects on 
the labor market. At this point, I have a number of questions about the 
results obtained. My hope would be that Hall’s further work on this issue 
will provide a better basis for assessing the robustness of the conclusions 
reported here.Comments on “Cyclical Movements along the 
Labor Supply Function” by Robert E. Hall
Susanto Basu
Bob Hall is famous for working in different areas of macroeconomics, 
making important contributions in each one, and then forsaking his cur-
rent area of research to work on other issues. But there is one topic to 
which he has returned again and again since his earliest days as an aca-
demic, understanding the behavior of unemployment and hours worked 
over the business cycle. The last few years have seen Hall produce a burst 
of papers that collectively deepen our understanding of this central issue 
in macroeconomics and labor economics. The present paper is another 
step in this important research program.
Let us review the facts that Hall takes as his starting point. Over the 
business cycle, we see large changes in employment and total hours 
worked, with relatively small changes in real wages. If one adopts the 
perspective that Hall takes in this paper, namely that business cycles are 
due to shifts in labor demand along a stable labor supply curve, these 
facts suggest that the labor supply curve must be quite ﬂ  at. However, 
microeconomic estimates of labor supply elasticities suggest that the elas-
ticity of hours worked with respect to wages for continuously employed 
workers is small—that is, the labor supply curve for employed workers 
is steep, not ﬂ  at.
But of course, changes in hours worked by the employed account for 
only a small fraction (perhaps 15 percent) of the cyclical variation in total 
hours worked. The vast majority of the variation in labor supply over the 
business cycle comes from changes in the number of people employed. 
Together, these facts suggest that the underpinnings of “macro labor sup-
ply”—the supply of total hours worked—are quite different from those The Cyclical Sensitivity of Labor Supply 272
assumptions typically used to explain micro labor supply, which involve 
utility-maximizing choices made by individuals in a frictionless, neoclas-
sical framework.
Hall thus moves to a framework where the determinants of micro and 
macro labor supply are different. In the paper that derives formally the 
framework explained heuristically in this paper, Hall (2008) shows how 
a variant of the popular Mortensen-Pissarides (MP) search-matching 
model yields a labor supply function of the form
(1)  L = H(λ, w)N(λ, w)
where L is total hours worked, H is hours per worker, N is the number 
of workers, w is the real wage, and λ is the marginal utility of wealth 
(assumed equal for everyone due to perfect consumption insurance). The 
supply of hours for employed workers takes the standard Frisch form: 
it is a function of the real wage and (expected) lifetime wealth. Hall’s 
striking achievement is to show that the number of workers available 
for employment is also a function of the same two variables. In the same 
paper, which I recommend highly to all who are interested in this topic, 
Hall shows that one can use a mix of calibration and estimation to infer 
the shapes of the H and N functions from household studies, plus aggre-
gate data on consumption, employment, and hours worked. The MP 
model ﬁ  ts the facts well once one modiﬁ  es the model as in Hall (2005), 
by assuming that the real wage is constant as long as it is within the bar-
gaining range that is efﬁ  cient for workers and ﬁ  rms.
While Hall’s interpretation of the facts is insightful and consistent with 
labor market paradigms that are currently in vogue, it is useful to ask 
whether there are alternative models of the labor market that can also 
explain the basic stylized facts. And if there are indeed alternative theo-
retical explanations, how might one use data to discriminate empirically 
among these competing models?
Models based on ﬁ  xed costs of going to work that are incurred by 
workers, such as Hansen (1985) and Rogerson (1988), try to explain the 
difference between micro and aggregate labor supply in a neoclassical 
framework. But Mulligan (2001) shows that the strong implications of 
these models come from the assumption in both papers that the ﬁ  xed cost 
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of going to work is identical across all workers. Once Mulligan allows 
for a distribution of this parameter, he ﬁ  nds that there are few implica-
tions of ﬁ  xed costs per se, and none that are signiﬁ  cant for labor supply 
over the business cycle.
The early Keynesian interpretation of the cyclical facts that motivate 
Hall also differentiates between micro and macro labor supply. But 
where Hall modiﬁ  es the neoclassical model by introducing the informa-
tion friction central to the MP model, the Keynesian story dismisses the 
neoclassical paradigm altogether, at least for the purpose of understand-
ing short-run aggregate ﬂ  uctuations in the labor market. In the Keynesian 
framework, workers agree to work as much as employers demand at a 
pre-set nominal wage. As in the model that Hall develops, the effective 
labor supply curve in the (Old) Keynesian model is indeed ﬂ  at—the pre-
set wage is independent of employment—and ﬂ  uctuations in employment 
and hours are determined by labor demand. If prices are approximately 
as sticky as wages, then real wages change relatively little over the busi-
ness cycle, matching what the data show.
One might object that the Keynesian framework does not determine the 
split of total hours worked between overall employment and hours per 
worker. But a small change in the set-up that introduces ﬁ  xed per-worker 
costs incurred by the ﬁ  rm—for example, beneﬁ  ts like health insurance, 
the value of which often is independent of the number of hours worked—
would remedy this problem.
The more fundamental problem that Hall sees in the Keynesian frame-
work is that its predictions are not derived from optimal decision-making 
by workers and ﬁ  rms. In a paper that has been central to Hall’s think-
ing on these issues, Barro (1977) pointed out that the contracts assumed 
in sticky-wage models are not Pareto-efﬁ  cient—that is, both ﬁ  rms and 
workers would gain by renegotiating to reduce wages in a downturn 
instead of cutting employment. Hall has adopted Barro’s view that even if 
observed nominal (or real) wages are sticky, the decisions on employment 
and hours are made in accordance with a long-term implicit contract 
between workers and ﬁ  rms in which wages are fully ﬂ  exible, with the 
observed spot wages being “installment payments” of the agreed-upon 
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A different set of models, based on efﬁ  ciency-wage considerations, also 
has implications for the difference between micro and macro labor sup-
ply. As an example, consider the efﬁ  ciency-wage model of Shapiro and 
Stiglitz (1984). Unlike the Keynesian model, the Shapiro-Stiglitz model 
assumes optimizing behavior by ﬁ  rms and workers. In fact, the famous 
labor-market diagram summarizing the predictions of the model bears a 
striking resemblance to Figure 5.3 of Hall’s paper. Both models predict 
equilibrium unemployment. Both display steep supply functions for total 
hours in the absence of frictions, but a relatively ﬂ  at effective labor sup-
ply curve in the environment with frictions. In Hall’s model the friction is 
an informational one—people do not automatically know where to ﬁ  nd a 
good match for their skills, and must invest in job search. In the Shapiro-
Stiglitz model, the friction is imperfect monitoring—workers and ﬁ  rms 
contract over the number of hours spent on the job, but the ﬁ  rm cannot 
contract over how hard the worker works each hour, since effort is not 
observed perfectly. Is one friction clearly more important than the other? 
The answer is not obvious to me. But macro labor research in recent 
years has focused almost exclusively on the MP model and its variants, 
and ignored the Shapiro-Stiglitz model.
Which of these four classes of models best explains the data? One would 
hope that such questions would be settled by confronting these compet-
ing models with data in a systematic fashion. Unfortunately, few such 
efforts have been made, and most are tests of a single model against an 
unspeciﬁ  ed alternative. The failure to test the models against one another 
is due partly to the fact that these models explain different features of 
the data. A major strength of the Mortensen-Pissarides search-matching 
framework, for example, is its ability to explain data on worker ﬂ  ows 
and job vacancies, but the other models have little or nothing to say 
about such issues. On the other hand, all the models of the labor market 
discussed above are able to match the key stylized facts of the data—in 
most cases, they were created to do so! Unfortunately, beyond match-
ing these facts, the models make surprisingly few empirical predictions, 
and the predictions they make are often ambiguous and subject to vary-
ing interpretations. A good example is the literature on efﬁ  ciency-wage 
models and inter-industry wage differentials. Efﬁ  ciency-wage models do 
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predict that workers in some industries might be paid higher wages than 
identical workers in other industries, but it is impossible to rule out the 
possibility that workers in different industries who appear identical to 
the econometrician actually differ in their labor market characteristics. 
Thus, in practice the choice between the matching-based framework 
that Hall advocates and the other models is guided as much by aesthetic 
considerations (what makes a good model?) and intuitive ones (what are 
the basic institutions and frictions in the labor market?) as by any formal 
empirical testing.
These are my comments on Hall’s current research agenda in labor eco-
nomics, of which the current paper is a part. Now let me turn to the novel 
contribution of the conference paper at hand. Relative to Hall (2008), 
the contribution in this paper is to derive an index of labor demand, and 
study how each component of labor input responds to labor demand. 
Hall is very clear in noting that his exercise is possible only under the 
assumption that the labor supply curve is stable over the business cycle. 
In terms of equation, the assumption is that changes in λ happen at low 
frequencies, but are not relevant for business cycles.
Unfortunately, this assumption does not hold for an important category 
of shocks, namely shocks to government expenditure. The empirical lit-
erature on these shocks, summarized in Perotti (2007), shows that these 
increase output and hours worked at high frequencies. Even in the post-
World War II period, there have been large, exogenous changes in U.S. 
government expenditure, usually associated with national security crises, 
notably the Korean and Vietnam Wars. But in the neoclassical labor sup-
ply framework in which Hall operates, spending shocks increase output 
and hours worked by raising λ, that is, by making consumers feel poorer 
which results in them working (and producing) more. 
Another way of making this point is to note that in a neoclassical 
framework with distortionary taxes, the labor demand curve can be 
expressed as:
(2)  w = (1 – τ)AFL(K, AL),
where τ is the (labor income) tax rate, F is a production function, K is capi-
tal, A is the state of technology, and the L subscript denotes the marginal The Cyclical Sensitivity of Labor Supply 276
product of labor. Since technology does not change in response to a ﬁ  scal 
shock and capital, a state variable, is essentially unchanged as well, the 
labor demand curve in (w, L) space shifts only if the tax rate changes. 
But one would think that current tax rates would rise in response to an 
increase in government spending, since the government requires more 
revenue, and indeed the empirical work conﬁ  rms this conjecture. In this 
situation, then the labor demand curve must shift inward. So if output 
and hours must rise to match the empirical evidence, then an outward 
shift in labor supply must be responsible for more than 100 percent of the 
increase in hours worked after an increase in government purchases.
In some non-neoclassical equilibrium models with imperfect competi-
tion (for example, Rotemberg and Woodford 1992), labor demand can 
shift out due to a fall in the mark-up of price over marginal cost. Even 
so, the mark-up changes in response to a change in output, and output 
would not change unless the labor supply curve shifts outward.
To conﬁ  rm that government purchase shocks do indeed have their 
expected effects on unemployment and hours per worker, I took the 
preferred series of government purchase shocks from Perotti (2007). 
(Roberto Perotti kindly supplied the data.) Figure 5.7 shows the effects 
of government purchase shocks on employment and hours per worker. 
As one would surmise, an unexpected increase in government purchases 
increases weekly hours and lowers unemployment. Some of the ﬂ  uctu-
ations are quite large, on the order of a half-percentage point change 
in the unemployment rate. Thus, under the maintained hypothesis that 
Hall’s framework provides the correct interpretation, the evidence shows 
that it is not safe to assume that changes in λ are negligible at high fre-
quencies.
In sum, Bob Hall is revolutionizing our understanding of one of the 
most perplexing issues in macroeconomics, the behavior of labor supply 
over the course of the business cycle. I remain an interested observer. 
Since I am unconvinced that a lack of information is the most important 
friction preventing the labor market from functioning smoothly over the 
business cycle, I am somewhat skeptical that this research program will 
attain all its promised objectives, but I remain hopeful. However, I am 
fairly sure that this particular paper will not contribute in any important 
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